

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SECTO 06004

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS) PARM, MARR, UNGA, LE, IS, CY, XF
SUBJECT: MEETING OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND SECRETARY
GENERAL WALDHEIM, MAY 24 (THIS TELEGRAM HAS NOT BEEN
CLEARED WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT)

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION THAT
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND SECRETARY VANCE HELD ON MAY 24
WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM.

1. SUMMARY. DURING MEETING OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND
SECRETARY VANCE WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM (SYG)
MAY 24 THEY DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD), STATUS OF SALT,
SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND PROBLEMS FACING UN
INTERIM FORCE (UNIFIL), STATUS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE
EFFORTS, AND PROSPECTS FOR RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL
TALKS ON CYPRUS. END SUMMARY.

2. VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPAN-
IED BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MAYNES
(IO) CALLED ON UN SECRETARY-GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM AT
12:30 P.M. MAY 24. OTHER PARTICIPANTS WERE UN UNDER
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-SECRETARIES GENERAL WILLIAM B. BUFFUM,
ROBERTO E. GUYER AND BRIAN E. URQUHART. ALSO PRESENT
AS NOTETAKER WAS MISOFF B.J.JONES.

3. VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE TOLD THE SYG THE US WAS LOOK-
ING FORWARD TO THE SSOD AND THAT HIS SPEECH IN THE
AFTERNOON WOULD BE SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL. WE WANTED TO

LISTEN AND LEARN AS WELL AS PRESENT OUR OWN VIEWS, AND WE HOPED THAT LONG OVERDUE PROGRESS WOULD RESULT FROM THE SESSION. HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD PROPOSE TO THE GA THAT THERE BE ANOTHER SPECIAL SESSION IN A FEW YEARS TO REVIEW MATTERS AND SEE WHAT FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE MADE.

4. WALDHEIM WAS GLAD THAT THE US WISHED TO MAINTAIN THE APPROACH OF THE SSOD. HE SAID HE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE PROBLEMS TO BE FACED BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE PUBLIC THAT THIS WAS NOT A NEGOTIATING SESSION BUT WAS DESIGNED TO DEVELOP GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MUST BE STRESSED, HE EMPHASIZED, IN ORDER TO AVOID AN ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION TO WHAT IT WOULD SEE AS A LACK OF RESULTS. IF THE SSOD COULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR PROGRESS IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, IN MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA, ON NUCLEAR FREE ZONES AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, WALDHEIM THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE MADE A REAL CONTRIBUTION. THE VICE PRESIDENT AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD BE MAKING SUGGESTIONS IN HIS SPEECH CONCERNING THE AREAS THE SYG HAD MENTIONED. WALDHEIM SAID EVERYONE, INCLUDING HIMSELF, WAS VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, AS THE US ROLE IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD WAS VERY IMPORTANT.

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5. SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT SOVIET FM GROMYKO WOULD BE ADDRESSING THE GA ON FRIDAY, MAY 26. THEN HE WOULD GO TO WASHINGTON, WHERE THE SECRETARY WOULD MEET WITH HIM SATURDAY, FOLLOWING UP THE CONVERSATION THEY WILL HAVE IN NEW YORK MAY 25. IN RESPONSE TO THE SYG'S QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS ON SALT II. ONLY TWO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES REMAINED: 1) THE BACKFIRE BOMBER AND NECESSARY ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE OPEN TO INTERCONTINENTAL USE, AND 2) THE CRUISE MISSILE AND PROBLEMS OF SEA-LAUNCH AND RANGE LIMITATIONS. THERE WERE OTHER LARGELY TECHNICAL ISSUES THAT COULD BE WORKED OUT BY THE TWO DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA. IN REPLY TO WALDHEIM'S QUERY ON TIMING OF AN AGREEMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID HE COULD NOT GUESS AND THAT IT WOULD DEPEND ON RESOLUTION OF THE TWO ISSUES HE HAD MENTIONED. IN THIS CONNECTION HE NOTED THAT GROMYKO HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH A NUMBER OF THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE US SSOD DELEGATION, INCLUDING AVERELL HARRIMAN AND THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

6. TURNING TO UNIFIL, THE SECRETARY CONGRATULATED

THE SYG ON THE UN'S HANDLING OF THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM. HE EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT ISRAELI PM BEGIN HAD FULFILLED HIS PROMISE AND THAT THE GOI HAS NOW SET A DATE FOR FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HE SAID HE HAD URGED PRINCE SAUD TO TRY TO GET COMMITMENTS FROM ARAFAT TO PREVENT PALESTINIAN INTERFERENCE WITH UNIFIL. SAUD HAD REPLIED THAT IF THE ISRAELIS SET A DATE FOR FINAL WITHDRAWAL IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SOMETHING WITH ARAFAT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE SECRETARY INQUIRED ABOUT THE CONVERSATIONS GUYER HAD HAD DURING HIS RECENT TRIP.

7. GUYER REPLIED THAT HIS TALKS HAD GONE FAIRLY WELL. HE SAID HE HAD OBTAINED TWO COMMITMENTS FROM ARAFAT, CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INFILTRATION OF ARMED ELEMENTS INTO UNIFIL'S AREA OF OPERATIONS AND NO HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST ANYONE IN THAT AREA. THESE WERE CONTINGENT, HOWEVER, ON THE THIRD PART OF A "PACKAGE". THE THIRD POINT REQUIRED UN AGREEMENT THAT PLO PERSONNEL WHO HAD STAYED BEHIND IN AREA ISRAELIS OCCUPIED (INCLUDING THOSE WHO ARE ARMED) COULD RECEIVE NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM PLO THROUGH UNIFIL LINES. THESE SUPPLIES COULD EVEN BE

DISTRIBUTED UNDER UN CONTROL. GUYER NOTED THAT UN MILITARY IN THE AREA WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIRD PART OF PROPOSAL; THEY BELIEVED PALESTINIANS COULD NOT BE TRUSTED AND THEY SHOULD BE "KICKED OUT" OF UNIFIL'S AREA. GUYER AGREED THAT THEY COULD NOT BE TRUSTED, BUT IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS IN THE AREA NOW, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REMOVE ANY OVER THAT NUMBER IN FUTURE. HE ALSO THOUGHT THIS ARRANGEMENT WITH THE PLO WOULD HELP THE UN'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE ARMED CHRISTIANS IN THE SOUTH.

8. WALDHEIM POINTED OUT THAT THE CHRISTIANS WERE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. GUYER SAID IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOL, SARKIS, BOUTROS AND KHOURY ALL AGREED THAT CHRISTIANS IN THE SOUTH SHOULD BE SENT "BACK TO BARRACKS" CONFIDENTIAL

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BUT THEY SAID THEY COULD NOT SINGLE OUT HADDAD FOR SEPARATE TREATMENT. GUYER THOUGHT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A NEGOTIATION WITH THE ISRAELIS IN ORDER TO GET THE CHRISTIANS INTO "BARRACKS" AND THIS WOULD BE A VERY TOUGH NEGOTIATION. GUYER AND WALDHEIM REPLIED TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S QUESTION THAT THE CHRISTIANS WERE SUPPLIED ENTIRELY BY THE ISRAELIS, BOTH WITH ARMS AND ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS. AMB YOUNG MENTIONED THAT UNICEF REP FROM BEIRUT HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE CHRISTIANS WERE MORE HEAVILY ARMED THAN THE PALESTINIANS, TO WHICH WALDHEIM AND GUYER AGREED.

9. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW ON GETTING LEBANESE FORCES TO THE SOUTH. GUYER SAID NO, THAT SARKIS HAD SAID IF THEY WERE SENT, THERE WOULD EITHER BE A CLASH WITH THE PALESTINIANS OR THEY WOULD JOIN HADDAD. WALDHEIM BRIEFLY REVIEWED PAST UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OF THE UN TO PERSUADE THE GOL TO TAKE ACTION ON THIS MATTER. HE NOTED SOME GENDARMES HAD BEEN SENT SOUTH. GUYER SAID THERE WERE NOW ABOUT 100 THERE AND SARKIS SAID MORE WOULD BE SENT, BUT GUYER WAS RATHER SKEPTICAL.

10. DESPITE MANY PROBLEMS, WALDHEIM SAID THAT ALTOGETHER THE SITUATION WAS MUCH BETTER THAN IT HAD BEEN EARLIER. HE SAID THE UN'S RELATIONS WITH THE PLO WERE GOOD NOW AND IT WAS NECESSARY, IN HIS VIEW, TO CONTINUE THIS COOPERATION. HE HOPED WHEN ISRAEL HAD WITHDRAWN ENTIRELY THE SITUATION WOULD REMAIN QUIET, BUT HE NOTED THE PROBLEM OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION GUYER SAID SARKIS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE GOL HAD DECIDED THAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUSPENDED - IN ABEYANCE - IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OF UNIFIL. ARAFAT, HE ADDED,

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HAD "HIT THE CEILING" WHEN GUYD TOLD HIM THIS AND HAD THREATENED UN WITH WAR IF THAT WAS WHAT IT WANTED. GUYER SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN POSITION THAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT IS NOT A UN PROBLEM BUT A MATTER BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE PLO. WALDHEIM REITERATED THE SAME POSITION.

11. BUFFUM REFERRED TO THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS NOT UNDER ARAFAT'S CONTROL. WALDHEIM AGREED THIS WAS STILL A DANGER AS THESE WERE THE ONES WHO HAD CAUSED MOST OF THE INCIDENTS. HE CITED DANGER IN TYRE AREA ESPECIALLY AND SAID WHEN ISRAEL COMPLETED ITS WITHDRAWAL IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REDEPLOY SOME UNIFIL TROOPS. HE SAID IT WAS PLANNED TO TAKE THE FRENCH OUT OF TYRE BARRACKS. HE NOTED PALESTINIAN POSITION THAT UNIFIL SHOULD NOT BE THERE IN ANY CASE SINCE ISRAEL HAD NOT OCCUPIED THAT AREA. GUYER NOTED THAT NON-PLO PALESTINIANS NEAR ARQUB HAD SHOT AT HIS HELICOPTER.

12. BUFFUM INQUIRED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR RESUMPTION OF MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT TWO QUESTIONS HAD BEEN PUT TO BEGIN AND DAYAN: 1) WOULD THEY BE PREPARED TO STATE THAT A DECISION COULD BE MADE ON SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AT THE END OF AN INTERIM PERIOD (OF 5 YEARS OR SO), AND 2) IF SO, COULD A MECHANISM BE SET UP TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISION? BEGIN HAD AGREED TO PROVIDE ANSWERS BUT WISHED TO CONSULT WITH HIS CABINET FIRST. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT IF THE FIRST ANSWER WAS YES, THIS WOULD BE A DEFINITE STEP FORWARD. IT WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE DECIDED WHAT THE MECHANISM SHOULD BE AND HOW THE PALESTINIANS COULD PARTICIPATE IN A DECISION REGARDING THEIR FUTURE. HE WAS UNABLE TO ESTIMATE HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO RECEIVE THE ISRAELI ANSWERS.

13. THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED, IN RESPONSE TO THE SYG'S
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QUESTION, THAT BILATERAL TALKS WOULD CONTINUE IN THE

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MEANTIME. HE SAID IT WAS HOPED THAT HUSSEIN WOULD JOIN
AT A LATER STAGE ONCE THE ISRAELI ANSWERS WERE RECEIVED;
HUSSEIN DID NOT WISH TO JOIN UNTIL INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS
WERE BEING DISCUSSED.

14. WALDHEIM WONDERED IF A MEETING IN GENEVA OR NEW
YORK UNDER UN AUSPICES WOULD BE USEFUL AT SOME STAGE.
HE SAID BEGIN HAD ASKED EARLIER THAT THE SYG DO NOTHING
FOR TIME BEING, WHILE BILATERAL TALKS CONTINUED. THE
SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT BEGILL FELT THAT WAY.
THE SYG NOTED INQUIRIES HE RECEIVES ON THIS, ESPECIALLY
FROM ARABS. BUFFUM THOUGHT INDICATIIN OF THIS POSSI-
BILITY MIGHT BE USEFUL PRESSURE ON BEGIN. THE VICE
PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, NOTED THE "TENDER FEELINGS" IN
US-ISRAELI RELATIONS AT PRESENT AND URGED THAT THERE BE
NO PUBLIC MENTION OF THIS POSSIBILITY AT THIS TIME.
THE SECRETARY SECONDED THIS AND WALDHEIM AGREED HE WOULD
SAY NOTHING AND IF ASKED WOULD SAY ONLY THAT THEY HAD
DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST.

15. THE SECRETARY RAISED QUESTION OF CYPRUS. HE
SAID IN MEETING WITH DENKTASH A FEW HOURS EARLIER
DENKTASH HAD BEEN EVEN MORE FORTHCOMING RE SOME SORT OF
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UN ADMINISTRATION FOR VAROSHA DURING A PERIOD OF NEGOTI-
ATIONS. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT DENKTASH'S STATEMENT OF
MAY 23 HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND HELPFUL. DENKTASH HAD TOLD
THE SECRETARY THAT IF KYPRIANOU WOULD ONLY MEET WITH

HIM (DENKTASH) FOR TWO MINUTES, THEY COULD AGREE ON A MISSING PERSONS COMMITTEE. THE SYG NOTED THAT ON THE OTHER HAND KYPRIANOU WANTS TO MEET WITH ECEVIT. ON VAROSHA, HE WONDERED IF THE REAL PROBLEM WOULD NOT BE GETTING GREEK-CYPRIOIOT AGREEMENT.

16. THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS PUZZLED BY THE GREEK-CYPRIOIOT ATTITUDE AND WONDERED IF IT WAS JUST TACTICAL. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE GREEK SIDE SEES THE EMBARGO AS THE MAIN ISSUE AND WANTS TO AVOID ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHILE THE EMBARGO IS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE CONGRESS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE GREEK-CYPRIOIOTS ARE NOT STRESSING TERRITORIAL ISSUES NOW BUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. KYPRIANOU HAD TOLD HIM THAT IF THEY ACCEPTED THE TURKISH PROPOSAL THEY WOULD BE ACCEPTING PARTITION OF THE ISLAND AND THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE.

17. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE A TACTICAL POSITION SINCE THEY HAD AGREED IT SHOULD BE A BIZONAL, FEDERATED STATE, BUT THE SYG SAID THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT EVEN CREATE A CONFEDERATION. THERE WOULD BE TWO SEPARATE STATES BOUND TOGETHER BY A VERY WEAK LINK - A ROTATING PRESIDENCY WITH ONLY CEREMONIAL POWERS. WHEN THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT DENKTASH HAD JUST TOLD HIM AGAIN THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WOULD BE FLEXIBLE, URQUHART NOTED THAT IT WAS A BASIC CONCEPT IN DISPUTE, NOT JUST DETAILS.

18. THE SECRETARY AGAIN EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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GREEK SIDE'S POSITION WAS TACTICAL, DESIGNED TO BLOCK LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. WALDHEIM NOTED THAT IN A PRIVATE MEETING WITH HIM ALONE KYPRIANOU HAD TOLD WALDHEIM THAT IF ECEVIT WOULD TELL KYPRIANOU DIRECTLY THAT THE PROPOSALS WERE JUST A STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS, KYPRIANOU COULD THEN USE THIS WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE AND AGREE TO RESUME THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. WALDHEIM THOUGHT IF ECEVIT WOULD AGREE TO A PRIVATE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU AND MAKE THIS POINT, IT OUGHT TO DO THE TRICK. KYPRIANOU, IN WALDHEIM'S VIEW, IS "WAITING FOR A CHANCE TO AGREE" BUT HAS PROBLEMS WITHIN HIS OWN GOVT.

19. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD TRY TO MAKE THIS CLEAR WHEN HE SEES ECEVIT IN WAHSINGTON. HE WONDERED WHETHER DENKTASH COULD BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A PRIVATE MEETING. HE DOUBTED THAT ECEVIT WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET KYPRIANOU ALONE. WALDHEIM AND URQUHART BOTH THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE AND WORTH TRYING. WALDHEIM

EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS POSITION, SINCE KYPRIANOU HAS TOLD HIM PRIVATELY THAT IF WALDHEIM CONVENES INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, KYPRIANOU WILL NOT SEND A DELEGATION. HE HAS NOT SAID THIS PUBLICLY, HOWEVER. THE SYG SAID HE HAS SUGGESTED VARIOUS WAYS THAT KYPRIANOU AND ECEVIT MIGHT MEET, PRIVATELY AT THE UN OR EVEN "BY CHANCE" IN THE DELEGATES' LOUNGE.

20. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GET KYPRIANOU AND ECEVIT (PLUS DENKTASH) TOGETHER UNDER THE UN UMBRELLA TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. WALDHEIM SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HOST A LUNCH OR DINNER IF THAT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER. HE NOTED THEY HAD MANAGED TO HAVE KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH AT A LUNCH TOGETHER IN CYPRUS; HOLDING A SOCIAL EVENT WITH WIVES ALSO INVITED, HAD FACILITATED MATTERS. HE HAD FOUND DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM THE MOST FRUSTRATING EXPERIENCE OF HIS
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LIFE BUT WAS READY TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO TRY TO BRING THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS ANXIOUS TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO HELP ALSO AND SINCE DENKTASH AND ECEVIT SAY THEY ARE FLEXIBLE HE HOPED SOMETHING COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. HE CONCLUDED

THE CONVERSATION BY CONFIRMING THAT HE WOULD MENTION A
MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU TO ECEVIT AND WOULD LET WALDHEIM
KNOW. VANCE

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